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Abstract
The transaction cost theory predicts that firms are inclined to vertically integrate trans-
actions in response to the specificity of their required inputs. Yet, reality proves that
some firms engage in repeated transactions with external suppliers aimed at procuring
highly specific inputs. To explain this phenomenon, this paper elaborates on a firm’s
make-or-buy decision in a context with relational contracts in order to investigate how
this decision is affected by the required input specificity. This paper demonstrates that
a high degree of input specificity can lead to repeated market transactions being favored
over vertical integration because demanding more specific inputs (i) impose lower costs
to maintain repeated market transactions founded on relational contracts; and (ii), facil-
itate the self-enforcement of these relational contracts.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Coase [1937], a stream of economic literature has emerged to ex-
plain why firms exist and utilize non-market in place of market transactions.1 However, a fun-
damental question remains relatively unanswered: What are the conditions driving firms to
integrate transactions? As Williamson [1971, 1979, 1985] and Klein, Crawford, and Alchian
[1978] argued, high levels of quasi-rents due to relation-specific investments increase the
likelihood of vertical integration.2 In the same vein, the procurement of highly specific in-
puts requires relation-specific investments such that input specificity can be considered as
an important driver for vertical integration. Market transactions in competitive markets thus
appear to be beneficial so long as buyers do not rely on relatively specific inputs. However,
if firms were to require highly specific inputs, the value of market transactions appears to
be limited because supplying firms may not make the necessary relation-specific investments
in anticipation of hold-up.3 This suggests a strong relationship between the degree of input
specificity and firms’ tendency to vertically integrate transactions. For instance, as reported
by Monteverde and Teece [1982], car manufacturers like Ford and General Motors procure
standardized inputs like mirrors, carpeting, safety belts, and wires from external suppliers. In
contrast, engines and automatic transmissions—which are highly specific inputs that must be
tailored to car manufacturers’ particular technical requirements—-are internally produced.
Contrary to this prediction however, the dependency on highly specific inputs does not al-
ways lead to vertical integration. For example, Boeing and Airbus rely on highly specific tur-
bofan engines for producing commercial airplanes. According to premise of the transaction
cost theory, we would expect both firms to vertically integrate the production of aircraft en-
1See Joskow [1988] and Demsetz [1988] for early, and Foss, Lando, and Thomsen [1998] and Holmström
and Roberts [1998] for more recent surveys.
2For more thoroughly discussions refer to Riordan and Williamson [1985], Joskow [1988], and Demsetz
[1988].
3The Fisher Body - General Motors case reported in Klein et al. [1978] and further analyzed by Klein [1988,
2000] is a widely used example for illustrating hold-up. For a summary of extreme examples of hold-up see
Shavell [2007].
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gines. Instead, Boeing and Airbus acquire custom-tailored engines from external producers:
Rolls Royce or CFM International (a joint venture between General Electric and the French
company Snecma). The relationships between the suppliers of aircraft engines—Rolls Royce
and CFM—and their customers—Boeing and Airbus—are characterized by long-term con-
tracts imposing significant relation-specific investments on the supplying side. For example,
Rolls Royce tailored the turbofan engine Trent XWB to the specific requirements of the Air-
bus A350 XWB family, whereas CFM developed the turbofan engine CFM56-3 exclusively
for Boeing aircrafts. Other engines produced by CFM, like the CFM56-5 series, are only
used by Airbus for its commercial airplanes. Chiu [1998] makes a similar observation and
argues that the correlation between relation-specific investments and vertical integration is
not as strong as the theory predicts.4 Two questions therefore emerge: First, how does the
degree of input specificity affect a firm’s input procurement? Second, can input specificity
serve as a rationale for the aforementioned counterintuitive phenomenon? The objective of
this paper thus endeavors to answer these questions by elaborating on a firm’s make-or-buy
decision in light of the specificity of required inputs.
Extant literature on the theory of the firm focused on two important drivers for vertical in-
tegration. Firstly, the property rights approach as devised by Grossman and Hart [1986], Hart
and Moore [1990], and Bolton and Whinston [1993], paid attention to the efficient allocation
of asset ownership as a mean to induce sufficient relation-specific investments. The efficient
ownership structure of assets in a context with relational contracts is further investigated by
Garvey [1995], Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy [2001], Bragelien [2001], Baker, Gibbons, and
Murphy [2002], and Halonen [2002]. Second, asset specificity as a potential explanatory
contribution to the theory of the firm—originated in the modern transaction cost theory a lá
Williamson [1971, 1979, 1985]—is thoroughly analyzed by Riordan and Williamson [1985],
Suzuki [2005], Kvaloy [2005], and Ruzzier [2007].5 Asset specificity governs incentives
4Whinston [2003] points to the same observation by noting that some firms even increase their mutual
dependency e.g. by agreeing upon exclusive contracts.
5Input specificity differs from asset specificity in two principal aspects. First, using specific assets is not
a necessity for custom-tailoring intermediate products. Even a generic asset can be utilized to produce highly
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for the contracting parties to behave opportunistically by taking advantage of the fact that
investments in relation-specific assets are not entirely reversible. Conceivably, the need for
significant investments in relation-specific assets is deemed as a valid argument for vertical
integration.6
Absent from these aforementioned studies is the investigation of the relationship between
the dependency on custom-tailored inputs and a firm’s make-or-buy decision. To understand
the nature of the firm, however, it is imperative to shed light on how a firm’s input procure-
ment is influenced by the specificity of required inputs. This paper closes a prevailing gap in
the literature on the theory of the firm by enhancing our understanding of a firm’s choice for
inter- vs. intra-firm trade.
This paper demonstrates that a firm relying on highly specific inputs can indeed favor
repeated market transactions over vertical integration. The rationale for this observation is a
follows. First, demanding more specific inputs impairs supplying firms’ bargaining positions
in repeated trading relationships. This eventually imposes lower costs on demanding firms
to maintain repeated market transactions founded on relational contracts. Second, a higher
degree of input specificity facilitates the self-enforcement of relational contracts between
firms, thereby inducing the efficient level of relation-specific investments. In so doing, this
paper offers a theoretical underpinning of the seemingly contradictory phenomenon that some
firms utilize repeated market transactions for procuring highly specific inputs.
One important characteristic of the framework analyzed in this paper is the consideration
of a firm’s make-or-buy decision in a context with relational contracts. Generally, relational
(or implicit) contracts refer to contracts, for which some elements are not enforceable by
specific intermediate products. The key is how this asset is being utilized in the production process. Consider
for instance the customization of marble plates for kitchen counters or window sills. The asset required to cut
marble plates—a diamond saw—can be utilized to produce plates ranging from standard to highly specific sizes.
In this sense, firms can produce intermediate products characterized by different degrees of specificity without
necessarily investing in specific assets. Second, in contrast to the acquisition of specific assets, producing
specific intermediate products is a repeated investment decision, implying that a firm is not entirely tied to these
(relation-specific) investments in the future.
6See also the discussion by Masten [1984] and Whinston [2003].
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third parties [MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989], or are prohibitively costly to specify ex ante
[Baker et al., 2002]. As documented in contemporary literature, relational contracts need to
be self-enforcing in repeated games in order to eliminate opportunistic behavior. In particular,
the framework in this paper comprises relational contracts within firms as analyzed by Bull
[1987], Pearce and Stacchetti [1998], and Levin [2003]; and between firms as considered by
Telser [1980], Klein and Leffler [1981], and Itoh and Morita [2005].
To model varying degrees of input specificity, the productive party is assumed to be in
charge of implementing multidimensional effort. The underlying idea is that the implemen-
tation of differential effort allocations leads to intermediate products with distinguishable
characteristics. A simple example is the emphasis on producing a high quality at the expense
of a high quantity ensuring certain quality characteristics of intermediate products, which are
potentially desired by a particular market participant.
The framework in this paper builds partially on the model devised by Baker et al. [2002].7
They investigated how asset ownership facilitates the achievement of superior relational con-
tracts within and between firms. Bragelien [2001] analyzed a more general version of their
framework by endogenizing a firm’s production technology. He demonstrated that the self-
enforcement of relational contracts between two firms might be facilitated by choosing a
production technology that requires highly relation-specific investments.
Furthermore, this paper is synonymous with the work of Kvaloy [2005] and Ruzzier
[2007], who illustrated that asset specificity can lead to non-integration. However, the grounds
for their observations are notably different. Kvaloy’s [2005] result is founded on the fact that
a higher degree of asset specificity can support the self-enforcement of relational contracts
between firms. In contrast, Ruzzier’s [2007] conclusion follows directly from the applica-
tion of the "deal-me-out" as the bargaining benchmark for market transactions [see Binmore,
Shaked, and Sutton, 1989].
7Though Baker et al. [2002] also analyzed a firm’s make-or-buy decision within a context of relational
contracts, they assumed—in contrast to the framework in this paper—that the agent is not financially constrained
such that the asset ownership can be transferred to the agent.
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the analyzed eco-
nomic environment. The optimal contracts under a firm’s alternative input procurements are
derived in section 3. In section 4, a firm’s optimal input procurement is identified; and inves-
tigated in light of how it is affected by different required degrees of input specificity. Section
5 summarizes the main results and concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a risk-neutral market participant (firm) henceforth referred to as the downstream
party. In every period, the downstream party needs an intermediate product to sustain her
production. The downstream party owns an asset which can be utilized to produce this input.
However, the downstream party lacks either the ability or the time to produce the input by
herself.
The downstream party can choose among two alternatives for procuring the required in-
put: (i) she can purchase the input from another risk-neutral market participant (firm) hence-
forth referred to as the upstream party (market transaction); or (ii), she can vertically inte-
grate its production (employment). The upstream party owns an identical asset as the down-
stream party such that their production technologies are comparable. If the downstream party
decides to integrate the production of the required input, she depends on a worker as pro-
ductive party. The worker is risk-neutral and financially constrained. For parsimony, his
reservation utility is zero.
All parties interact for an infinite number of periods and share the same interest rate
r.8 In every period, depending on the chosen type of transaction, either the worker (W )
or the upstream party (U ) produces the input by implementing non-verifiable effort ei =
(ei1, ei2)
T ∈ R2+, i = W,U .9 Effort imposes strictly convex increasing costs C(ei) =
8Infinitely living parties can be obtained by assuming overlapping generations of individuals who in turn
live only a certain number of periods [Thomas and Worrall, 1988].
9All vectors are column vectors, where ‘T ’ denotes the transpose.
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cie
T
i ei/2, i = W,U , where for parsimony cW = 1. Moreover, to reflect potential agency
costs of production for the upstream party, let cU ≥ 1.
The characteristics of the input are determined by the implemented effort allocation. Let
µ = (µ1, µ2)
T ∈ R2+ and ω = (ω1, ω2)T ∈ R2+ represent the relative effort allocation—
and therefore the attributes of the input—desired by the downstream party and other market
participants, respectively. As illustrated in figure 1, the degree of input specificity required by
the downstream party can then be measured by the geometric relation ofµ andω: the angle ϕ.
The greater ϕ is, the more specific is the intermediate product the downstream party requires
for further processing. The degree of input specificity—measured by ϕ—is exogenously
determined by the downstream’s production technology which the input is required for.10 To
reduce the notational burden, it is assumed that ‖µ‖ = ‖ω‖ = 1, i.e. the lengths of µ and ω
are normalized to one.
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Figure 1: Desired Effort Allocations and Input Specificity
As mentioned above, the implemented effort allocation—and hence the properties of the
input—determines its value for the downstream party and for the other market participants. In
particular, the downstream’s (internal) value I and the market (external) valueE can be either
high (indexed byH) or low (indexed by L), where∆I ≡ IH − IL and∆E ≡ EH −EL. The
10I discuss in section 5 a firm’s choice with respect to the specificity of required inputs if the production
technology gives some scope for processing inputs with different characteristics.
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Transaction Contract
Spot Contract Relational Contract
Integration Spot Employment (SE) Relational Employment (RE)
Market Spot Market (SM) Relational Market (RM)
Table 1: Combinations of Transactions and Contracts
internal and external input values are observable by all involved entities, but non-verifiable
by third parties. Let
Prob{I = IH |ei} = min{µTei, 1},
Prob{E = EH |ei} = min{ωTei, 1}
be the conditionally independent probabilities that the high internal and high external in-
put value will be realized. Observe that maximizing the expected internal value requires a
different effort allocation than maximizing the expected external value if µ and ω are lin-
early independent. In this case, the downstream party requires a specific input with certain
attributes diverging from those desired by other market participants. Independent of the real-
ized input value, however, the downstream party always prefers an internal use to sustain her
production. Formally, this requires that IH > IL ≥ EH > EL, where EL is normalized to
zero. Finally, to ensure interior solutions, it is assumed that ∆I,∆E < 1.11
For both types of transactions being considered—vertical integration and market exchange—
the downstream party can utilize either a spot contract, or a relational contract contingent on
the non-verifiable, but observable input value. If the involved parties agree upon a relational
contract, they play a grim trigger strategy: Once they detect a violation of implicit obligations,
they will never rely on relational contracts with the violator again. Subsequently considered
combinations of transactions and contracts are summarized in table 1, using the terminology
established by Baker et al. [2002].
11Alternatively, one can let∆I,∆E > 1 by assuming that µTµ and ωTω are sufficiently small. In this case,
the lengths of µ and ω appear in the subsequent solutions. Since this does not provide additional insights, I
opted for the first alternative for parsimony purposes.
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3 Alternative Input Procurements
In the subsequent sections, I elaborate on the downstream’s alternatives to procure the re-
quired input as summarized in table 1. This eventually allows me to identify the optimal
input procurement from the downstream’s perspective, and to illustrate the effect of input
specificity on her make-or-buy decision.
3.1 Spot Employment
Consider first the case where the downstream party recruits the worker as the productive
party for one period. Since verifiable information about the realized input value are not
available, the downstream party cannot provide the worker with an enforceable incentive
contract. Nevertheless, the downstream party can promise to pay a bonus in the event that
the high internal input value is realized. Once this occurs however, the downstream party
takes the input without paying the promised bonus since she owns the asset and possesses the
related property rights [Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore, 1990]. Anticipating this
opportunistic behavior, the worker implements eW = (0, 0)T such that the downstream party
obtains ΠD|SE = IL under spot employment.
3.2 Relational Employment
If the downstream party repeatedly interacts with the worker, a relational incentive contract
can be self-enforcing, and therefore credible. Particularly, the downstream party can promise
to pay the worker a bonus β in addition to a fixed transfer α in the event that the high internal
input value is realized. The worker’s wage payment w therefore takes the form
w =
 α+ β, if I = IHα, if I = IL, (1)
where the worker’s liability limit requires that w is always non-negative.
As a consequence of the implicit nature of this bonus contract, the downstream’s promise
to pay β needs to be reliable. Let Π˜RE ≡ max{ΠD|SE,ΠD|SM ,ΠD|RM} denote the down-
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stream’s expected profit obtained under her best alternative after violating the relational con-
tract with the worker. After behaving opportunistically by reneging on β, the downstream
party can henceforth either choose spot employment (SE), or engage in market transactions
with the upstream party based on explicit (SM ) or implicit (RM ) contracts. Suppose for a
moment that the high internal input value is eventually realized. Then, the downstream party
honors her implicit obligation to pay β if
−β + Π
D|RE
r
≥ Π˜
RE
r
. (2)
The left side of (2) represents the downstream’s expected payoff when she delivers on her
promise, i.e. paying the bonus β but obtaining the expected profit under relational employ-
ment ΠD|RE in the future. To be deterred from reneging, this payoff needs to be greater
than the present value of her best fall-back position Π˜RE . If this self-enforcement condition
is satisfied, the worker anticipates the downstream party to deliver on her promise to pay β
whenever I = IH such that he is motivated to implement effort.
The optimal relational contract maximizes the difference between the expected internal
input value and the worker’s expected wage payment. Consequently, the downstream’s prob-
lem can be stated as follows:
max
α,β,eW
ΠD|RE = IL +∆IµTeW − α− βµTeW (3)
s.t.
α+ βµTeW − 1
2
eTWeW ≥ 0 (4)
eW ∈ argmax
e˜W
α+ βµT e˜W − 1
2
e˜TW e˜W (5)
α+ β ≥ 0 (6)
α ≥ 0 (7)
IL +∆Iµ
TeW − α− βµTeW − Π˜RE ≥ βr. (8)
Condition (4) is the worker’s participation constraint and ensures that it is in his interest to
enter this employment relationship. Further, (5) is the worker’s incentive constraint, implying
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that he implements eW = βµ. Constraints (6) and (7) guarantee that the relational bonus
contract is compatible with the worker’s liability limit. Finally, (8) is the self-enforcement
condition ensuring that the relational bonus contract does not motivate the downstream party
to renege on β ex post.
Proposition 1 Under relational employment, the optimal relational bonus contract (α∗, β∗)
leads to the downstream’s expected profit
ΠD|RE(r) =

IL +
1
4
(∆I)2, if r ≤ rRE
r
2
[∆I − r + 2φ] + Π˜RE, if rRE < r ≤ r̂RE
IL, if r̂RE < r,
(9)
where
rRE ≡ ∆I
2
− 2
∆I
[
Π˜RE − IL
]
r̂RE ≡ ∆I − 2
[
Π˜RE − IL
] 1
2
φ ≡
[
1
4
(∆I − r)2 + IL − Π˜RE
] 1
2
.
Proof See appendix.
If r ≤ rRE , the downstream party sufficiently values a sustained employment relation-
ship with the worker such that her promise to pay the optimal bonus β∗ = ∆I/2 is credi-
ble.12 For rRE < r ≤ r̂RE , however, the downstream party cannot credibly commit to pay
β∗ = ∆I/2. This is because a higher interest rate r imposes a less severe ‘penalty’ on the
downstream party for violating the relational contract with the worker. Thus, the downstream
party would behave opportunistically by reneging ex post on β∗. Nevertheless, to motivate
the worker to implement effort, she needs to diminish the bonus β with the aim of satisfying
the self-enforcement condition (8). Technically, (8) becomes binding. However, the more the
credible bonus β∗(r) deviates from the efficient bonus β∗ = ∆I/2, the lower is the down-
stream’s expected profit ΠD|RE(r). Finally, if r > r̂RE , the downstream party cannot find a
strictly positive bonus which eliminates her reneging temptation. As a result, β∗ = 0, and the
downstream party obtains the same expected profit as under spot employment.
12See proof of proposition 1 in the appendix for a characterization of the optimal relational bonus contract.
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3.3 Spot Market
Instead of utilizing an integrated production, the downstream party can alternatively procure
the input from the upstream party through a spot market exchange. Under this arrangement,
both parties negotiate in every period about a price ΥSM in exchange for the input. This
price is obtained by applying the Nash-Bargaining solution with equal bargaining power.
Accordingly, the downstream party pays the external input value E plus half of the surplus
I − E for its internal use. Consequently, ΥSM = [I + E]/2.
The upstream party chooses effort eU with the objective of maximizing her expected
profit ΠU |SM = E[ΥSM |eU ]− C(eU). Equivalently,
max
eU
ΠU |SM =
1
2
[
IL +∆Iµ
TeU +∆Eω
TeU
]− 1
2
cUe
T
UeU , (10)
which directly implies that the upstream party implements
e∗U =
1
2cU
[∆Iµ+∆Eω] . (11)
Apparently, the upstream party intends to maximize the internal and external input value
with the aim of improving her own expected bargaining position, and hence, the price she
expects to obtain. Observe further that the upstream party does not perfectly tailor the input
to the downstream’s requirements if µ 6= λω, λ > 0. In this case, adjusting the input to the
downstream’s and to other market participants’ needs are two competing objectives.
If the upstream party anticipates a spot market transaction with the downstream party, she
implements e∗U and obtains:
ΠU |SM =
1
2
IL +
1
8cU
[
(∆I)2 + (∆E)2 + 2∆I∆E cosϕ
]
. (12)
Notice that the upstream’s expected profit ΠU |SM is decreasing in the degree of input speci-
ficity ϕ desired by the downstream party. This can be observed because the upstream’s trade-
off between tailoring the input to the downstream’s versus the market’s requirements becomes
more severe. This eventually deteriorates the upstream’s expected bargaining position, and as
a consequence, leads to a smaller expected premium for selling the input to the downstream
party in place of the other market participants.
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If the downstream party decides in favor of spot market exchange with the upstream party,
her expected profit ΠD|SM is the difference between the expected internal input value and the
price she expects to pay. Formally, ΠD|SM = E[I −ΥSM |e∗U ], which is equivalent to
ΠD|SM =
1
2
IL +
1
4cU
[
(∆I)2 − (∆E)2] . (13)
The downstream’s expected profit ΠD|SM under spot exchange is apparently independent of
the specificity measure ϕ. Nevertheless, there are two countervailing effects of ϕ on ΠD|SM .
It can be shown that
∂ E[I|e∗U ]
∂ϕ
=
∂ E[ΥSM |e∗U ]
∂ϕ
= − 1
2cU
∆I∆E sinϕ. (14)
Accordingly, an increase in ϕ leads to a lower expected internal input value and a lower price
the downstream party expects to pay. Since the magnitudes of both effects are identical,
they cancel each other out such that ΠD|SM is eventually not affected by the desired degree
of input specificity. Generally speaking, a lower expected price perfectly compensates the
downstream party for the expected exchange of an insufficiently tailored input.
3.4 Relational Market
As demonstrated in the preceding section, utilizing spot market transactions with the up-
stream party leads to the procurement of an insufficiently tailored input. To ensure the ex-
change of a perfectly tailored input however, the downstream party can promise the upstream
party to pay a certain amount conditional on the realized internal input value I . This is aimed
at motivating the upstream party to make relation-specific investments because tailoring the
input to the downstream’s requirements irretrievably impairs its expected market value.
Let PL denote the floor payment both parties consent to in an enforceable contract for
exchanging the input, regardless of its final value. In addition, to motivate relation-specific
investments in the sense of tailoring the input, the downstream party promises to pay the
upstream party a higher price PH if I = IH . Thus, this contract consists of an explicit
component PL and a non-enforceable premium ∆P ≡ PH − PL. However, the upstream
party is only motivated to tailor the input if the downstream’s promise to pay the premium
12
∆P is reliable. Let Π˜RM ≡ max{ΠD|SE,ΠD|RE,ΠD|SM} denote the downstream’s expected
profit she obtains under her best fall-back position. Suppose that the high internal input value
is eventually realized. The downstream party has no incentive to hold up the upstream party
by reneging on ∆P if
−∆P + Π
D|RM
r
≥ Π˜
RM
r
. (15)
The downstream party adheres to her promise if paying the premium∆P but perpetuating the
long-term trading relationship with the upstream party provides her with a higher expected
profit than her best fall-back position.
The payments PL and PH need to guarantee that it is in the upstream’s interest to enter into
a long-term trading relationship with the downstream party. This requires that the upstream
party is at least weakly better off under relational market than under her best alternative. It
is crucial here to note that her best alternative is directly linked to the downstream’s best
fall-back position. If the downstream’s best fall-back is to engage in spot market exchange,
the upstream’s reservation profit is ΠU |SM as derived in section 3.3. By contrast, if vertical
integration is the downstream’s best alternative, the upstream’s reservation profit is the one
she obtains by selling the intermediate product on the market at the market price ΥM = E.
In this case, it can be verified that the upstream party implements e∗U = ∆Eω/cU , providing
her with
ΠU |M =
1
2cU
(∆E)2. (16)
The purpose of the optimal relational contract is to maximize the difference between the
expected internal input value and the expected payment to the upstream party. The down-
stream’s problem is therefore
max
PL,PH ,eU
ΠD|RM = IL +∆IµTeU − PL −∆PµTeU (17)
s.t.
PL +∆Pµ
TeU − 1
2
cUe
T
UeU ≥ Π¯U (18)
eU ∈ argmax
e˜U
PL +∆Pµ
T e˜U − 1
2
cU e˜
T
U e˜U (19)
IL +∆Iµ
TeU − PL −∆PµTeU − Π˜RM ≥ ∆Pr, (20)
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where
Π¯U =

1
2
IL +
1
8cU
[∆Iµ+∆Eω]2 , if Π˜RM = ΠD|SM
1
2cU
(∆E)2, if Π˜RM 6= ΠD|SM ,
(21)
is the upstream’s reservation profit conditional on the downstream’s best fall-back position.
Condition (18) is the upstream’s participation constraint guaranteeing that the proposed re-
lational contract makes her at least weakly better off than her best alternative. Further, (19)
is the upstream’s incentive constraint, implying that she implements e∗U = ∆Pµ/cU . Fi-
nally, the self-enforcement condition (20) ensures that the downstream party is not tempted
to renege ex post on the non-enforceable premium ∆P .
As demonstrated, the upstream’s reservation profit can take one of two values conditional
on the downstream’s best fall-back position. For the sake of lucidity, I subsequently consider
both cases separately.
Proposition 2 If Π˜RM = ΠD|SM under relational market, the optimal relational contract
(P ∗L, P
∗
H) leads to the downstream’s expected profit
ΠD|RM(r) =

1
2
IL +
1
2cU
(∆I)2 − 1
8cU
[∆Iµ+∆Eω]2 , if r ≤ rRM
r [∆I − rcU + φ] + ΠD|SM , if rRM < r ≤ r̂RM
ΠD|SM , if r̂RM < r,
(22)
where
rRM ≡ 1
8cU∆I
[∆Iµ−∆Eω]2 r̂RM ≡ 1
cU
[
∆I − η 12
]
φ ≡ [(∆I − rcU)2 − η] 12 η ≡ 1
4
(∆Iµ+∆Eω)2 + cU
(
2ΠD|SM − IL
)
.
Proof See appendix.
As long as r ≤ rRM , the downstream party honors her non-enforceable obligation to pay
the optimal premium ∆P ∗ = ∆I if I = IH .13 In this case, the upstream party anticipates
that holdup will not occur, and is therefore motivated to make the desired relation-specific
13See proof of proposition 2 in the appendix for the characterization of the optimal relational contract.
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investment in the sense of tailoring the input to the downstream’s requirements. In contrast,
if rRM < r ≤ r̂RM , the downstream party needs to diminish the premium ∆P ∗(r) aimed
at eliminating her reneging temptation. Technically, the self-enforcement condition (20) be-
comes binding. The provision of an inefficient (but credible) premium ∆P ∗(r) inevitably
leads to a lower expected profit for the downstream party. Finally, if r > r̂RM , the down-
stream party cannot find a strictly positive and reliable premium to provide the upstream
party with incentives to tailor the input. If so, the downstream party engages in spot market
exchange with the upstream party and obtains ΠD|SM .
To gain further insights, one can re-write ΠD|RM for r ≤ rRM as14
ΠD|RM =
1
2
IL +
1
2cU
(∆I)2 − 1
8cU
[
(∆I)2 + (∆E)2 + 2∆I∆E cosϕ
]
. (23)
Apparently, if Π˜RM = ΠD|SM , the downstream’s expected profit ΠD|RM depends on the
specificity measure ϕ. The rationale for this observation is as follows: Ensuring the up-
stream’s participation requires that she obtains at least the same expected profit under rela-
tional market as under mutual spot exchange. The floor payment PL thus reflects the up-
stream’s reservation profit ΠU |SM , which in turn is a function of ϕ, see section 3.3. Conse-
quently, the degree of input specificity also affects the downstream’s expected profit under
relational market if spot exchange is her best fall-back, i.e. if ΠD|SM = Π˜RM . Furthermore,
as discussed in section 3.3, a higher degree of input specificity (greater ϕ) impairs the up-
stream’s expected profit ΠU |SM under spot market exchange. This in turn makes it less costly
for the downstream party to ensure the upstream’s participation, thereby leading to a higher
expected profit ΠD|RM . The same observation applies for ΠD|RM if rRM < r ≤ r̂RM .
Finally, re-consider the cut off interest rate r̂RM . Substituting ΠD|SM gives
r̂RM =
∆I
cU
− 1
2cU
[
3(∆I)2 − (∆E)2 + 2∆I∆E cosϕ] 12 . (24)
Apparently, r̂RM is increasing in the specificity measure ϕ. As emphasized, a higher de-
gree of input specificity enhances the downstream’s expected profit under relational market if
ΠD|SM = Π˜RM . This imposes a more severe ‘penalty’ on the downstream party for violating
14To see this, note that µTω = ‖µ‖‖ω‖ cosϕ and ‖µ‖ = ‖ω‖ = 1.
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the relational contract with the upstream party by reneging on the non-enforceable premium
∆P . The lower reneging temptation is reflected by a higher cut off interest rate r̂RM . It
can be further shown that the same observation applies for rRM . This result is in line with
Halonen [2002] who also recognized that less attractive outside options alleviate incentives
to behave opportunistically.
Proposition 3 If Π˜RM 6= ΠD|SM under relational market, the optimal relational contract
(P ∗L, P
∗
H) leads to the downstream’s expected profit
ΠD|RM(r) =

IL +
1
2cU
[
(∆I)2 − (∆E)2] , if r ≤ rRM
r [∆I − rcU + φ] + Π˜RM , if rRM < r ≤ r̂RM
ΠD|SM , if r̂RM < r,
(25)
where
rRM ≡ 1
2cU∆I
[
(∆I)2 − (∆E)2 − 2cU
(
Π˜RM − IL
)]
r̂RM ≡ 1
cU
[
∆I − η 12
]
φ ≡ [(∆I − rcu)2 − η] 12 η ≡ [(∆E)2 + 2cU (Π˜RM − IL)] .
Proof See appendix.
In principle, the illustrated relationship between the interest rate r and the downstream’s
expected profit for the case Π˜RM = ΠD|SM also applies in the event that Π˜RM = ΠD|SM .
Observe however, that the downstream’s expected profit when Π˜RM = ΠD|SM is not affected
by the specificity measure ϕ because the upstream’s reservation profit ΠU |SM is now inde-
pendent of ϕ. Therefore, the relational contract with the upstream party does not capture ϕ,
and so does ΠD|RM .
4 Input Procurement and Input Specificity
This section elaborates on the efficient input procurement from the perspective of the down-
stream party. Further, it demonstrates how the downstream’s make-or-buy decision is affected
by her desired degree of input specificity.
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To characterize the downstream’s optimal input procurement, let us first identify the opti-
mal spot contract. Suppose for a moment that the interest rate r is sufficiently high such that
relational contracts are not feasible. It is straightforward to see that ΠD|SM ≥ ΠD|SE implies
(∆E)2 ≤ (∆I)2 − 2cUIL ≡ Θ (26)
As long as relational contracts cannot be attained and (∆E)2 ≤ Θ, procuring the input
through mutual spot exchange with the upstream party dominates an internal production.15
More precisely, a market transaction is superior to an integrated production, if the market
valuation towards the difference between the high and low external value of the input is
sufficiently low. In this case, the expected bargaining position of the upstream party, and
consequently the expected price for the input, are adequately low. By contrast, if (∆E)2 > Θ,
the downstream party would prefer an integrated production since acquiring the input via spot
market transactions would impose higher costs.
To identify the downstream’s optimal make-or-buy decision, it is further necessary to
compare relational employment and relational market in terms of their profitabilities. First,
suppose that the interest rate r is sufficiently low such that both relational contracts with
efficient incentive schemes are self-enforcing. Formally, r ≤ min{rRM , rRE}. It is demon-
strated in the appendix that for ΠD|RM ≥ ΠD|RE ,
(∆E)2 ≤ Φ, if ΠD|SM = Π˜RM (27)
(∆E)2 ≤ Φ, if ΠD|SM 6= Π˜RM , (28)
where
Φ ≡
[[
κ2 + (∆I)2 (3− 2cU)− 4cUIL
] 1
2 − κ
]2
Φ ≡ 1
2
(∆I)2 (2− cU) κ ≡ ∆I cosϕ.
A long-term trading relationship with the upstream party (relational market) is generally more
profitable than integration if ∆E is sufficiently low. The rationale for this observation is that
15This particulary requires that cU < (∆I)2/(2IL), i.e. the upstream’s production of the input is not too
inefficient relative to the downstream’s. Otherwise, spot employment would be the preferred spot contract for
all values of (∆E)2.
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a lower ∆E diminishes the value of the upstream’s outside option, and therefore mitigates
the downstream’s costs for ensuring her participation. Observe however, that we have two
different threshold levels: Φ and Φ. This is because the downstream’s expected profit for
relational market is conditional on whether or not a spot market exchange is her best fall-
back position.
For ri < r ≤ r̂ i, i = RM,RE, the downstream party needs to adjust the incentive
schemes for both relational contracts aimed at ensuring their self-enforcement. In general,
ΠD|RM(r) ≥ ΠD|RE(r) if
(∆E)2 ≤ Ψ(r), if Π˜RM = ΠD|SM (29)
(∆E)2 ≤ Ψ(r), if Π˜RM 6= ΠD|SM , (30)
where (∆E)2 = Ψ(r) implies ΠD|RM(r) = ΠD|RE(r) for Π˜RM = ΠD|SM , and (∆E)2 =
Ψ(r) for Π˜RM 6= ΠD|SM , respectively.16
The identified cut offs now allow for characterizing the downstream’s optimal input pro-
curement for different values of r and ∆E.
Proposition 4 The downstream party chooses relational market and receives ΠD|RM(r) in
the intervals
0 < (∆E)2 ≤ min{Φ,Θ} and Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Φ, if r ≤ rRM ;
0 < (∆E)2 ≤ min{Ψ(r),Θ} and Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Ψ(r), if rRM < r ≤ r̂RM .
In contrast, the downstream party prefers relational employment and obtains ΠD|RE(r) for
Φ < (∆E)2 ≤ Θ and Φ < (∆E)2, if r ≤ rRE;
Ψ(r) < (∆E)2 ≤ Θ and Ψ(r) < (∆E)2, if rRE < r ≤ r̂RE.
Finally, if r > r̂RM or r > r̂RE in the relevant intervals, the downstream party receives
ΠD = max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|SE}.
16Due to the structure of ΠD|RM (r) and ΠD|RE(r) for ri < r ≤ r̂ i, i = RM,RE, one cannot achieve a
tractable closed form solution. Nevertheless, using the implicit characterizations does not derogate the subse-
quent results.
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Proof See appendix.
To shed more light on the downstream’s make-or-buy decision, suppose for a moment
that r ≤ min{r̂RM , r̂RE}, i.e. both relational contracts are self-enforcing.17 In general, rela-
tional market is superior for low values of ∆E. Nevertheless, relational employment can be
temporarily preferred by the downstream party in the interval Ψ(r) < (∆E)2 ≤ Θ, whereas
for Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Ψ(r), relational market is again more profitable. The reason for obtaining
spanned intervals is as follows: Different fall-back positions for relational market—spot mar-
ket exchange or integrated spot production—impose diverse costs to the downstream party
for ensuring the upstream’s participation. This further provides the downstream party with
differential expected profits, and as a consequence, leads to diverse cut off interest rates for
the feasibility of relational contracts. Note however, that the previous argumentation applies
only if Ψ(r) < Θ < Ψ(r), which in turn depends on the specific parameter values. Other-
wise, there exists only one threshold level of ∆E where the downstream party is indifferent
between relational market and relational employment.
The downstream’s optimal input procurement is illustrated in figure 2, where the squared
spread of the external input value (∆E)2 is on the horizontal axis, and the interest rate r
on the vertical axis. It is important to note here that figure 2 represents the downstream’s
make-or-buy decision for the case Φ,Ψ(r) > Θ and (∆I)2 cos2 ϕ > Θ.18 The subsequent
explanations generally apply to the other cases as well.
Consider first the downstream’s preferred spot transactions, which eventually determine
her best fall-back for relational contracts. Spot contracts are chosen whenever the interest
rate r is sufficiently high such that relational contracts cannot be attained. As previously
observed, spot market exchange dominates spot employment if the market valuation towards
the difference between the high and low external value of the input ∆E is sufficiently low.
By contrast, if the interest rate r is adequately low, the downstream party can utilize a rela-
17See proof of proposition 4 in the appendix for a characterization of r̂RM , rRM , r̂RE , and rRE .
18The latter condition implies that r̂RM is convex decreasing in (∆E)2 for 0 < (∆E)2 ≤ min{Ψ(r),Θ}.
Further, it can be shown that r̂RE is convex increasing in (∆E)2 if spot market is the downstream’s best fall-
back. In contrast, if spot employment is her best alternative, r̂RE is constant in (∆E)2.
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Figure 2: Optimal Transactions and Contracts
tional contract to provide either the upstream party or the worker with appropriate incentives.
Particulary, the downstream party prefers a long-term trading relationship with the upstream
party whenever ∆E is sufficiently low; and a repeated employment relationship with the
worker, otherwise.
To illustrate the effect of input specificity on the downstream’s make-or-buy decision,
suppose the downstream party requires a more specific intermediate product. Formally, ϕ
increases to ϕ′. As long as spot market exchange is the downstream’s best fall-back for
relational market (Π˜RM = ΠD|SM ), demanding a more specific input leads to the effects as
discussed in section 3.4. First, the profitability of relational market rises such that Ψ(r) and
Φ increase in ϕ for r ≤ r̂RM . Second, as a direct consequence of the enhanced profitability,
the cut off interest rates rRM and r̂RM increase.
The effect of varying degrees of input specificity on the downstream’s make-or-buy deci-
sion is also depicted in figure 2, where the dashed lines characterize the new cut-offs for ϕ′.
Consider first area A. Here, the downstream party can engage in a superior long-term trad-
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ing relationship with the upstream party (relational market), if she depends on a sufficiently
specific input (high ϕ). Otherwise, she would be compelled to utilize less profitable spot
market exchange. Recall that demanding a more specific input—characterized by a higher
ϕ—deteriorates the upstream’s benefit of engaging in mutual spot exchange as the best al-
ternative to relational market. This further improves the downstream’s expected profit under
relational market, and therefore enhances her prospective ’penalty’ for violating the relational
contract with the upstream party. This in turn is reflected by higher threshold interest rates
rRM and r̂RM , respectively. Generally speaking, the downstream party can now motivate
the upstream party to make relation-specific investments in form of perfectly tailoring the
intermediate product, even for higher interest rates.
Next, consider area B in figure 2. Here, the downstream party engages in a long-term
trading relationship with the upstream party whenever she demands a sufficiently specific
input (high ϕ). Otherwise, the downstream party would have procured the input through
an integrated production. Accordingly, in this area, demanding a highly specific input leads
to repeated market transactions dominating vertical integration. Again, this observation is
founded on the impairment of the upstream’s best alternative and hence, her bargaining po-
sition. This further results in the enhancement of the profitability of repeated market relative
to integrated transactions from the downstream’s perspective.
Summarizing the above observations, a firm depending on sufficiently specific intermedi-
ate products might favor repeated market transactions over vertical integration for their pro-
curement. This deduction is rooted in the impairment of the upstream’s bargaining position
occurring whenever spot market exchange is the downstream’s best alternative to repeated
market transactions. Thus, the proposed framework in this paper yields a potential expla-
nation of the contradictory phenomenon whereby certain firms engage in repeated market
transactions for procuring highly specific inputs.
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5 Conclusion
Prior literature on the theory of the firm presents a number of reasons why firms prefer in-
tegrated instead of market transactions. This paper elaborates on the specificity of required
inputs and its effect on a firm’s make-or-buy decision. In doing so, it sheds light on the con-
tradictory phenomenon that certain firms engage in repeated market transactions despite a
strong reliance on highly specific inputs.
The analysis in this paper highlights one import conclusion: A firm might favor repeated
market transactions if the procured input is sufficiently specific. The rationale for this obser-
vation is as follows: First, demanding a more specific input impairs the supplier’s bargaining
position for mutual market transactions since tailored intermediate products are less likely to
be purchased by other market participants. This in turn imposes lower costs on demanding
firms for sustaining repeated market transactions founded on relational contracts. Second,
relying on more specific inputs facilitates the self-enforcement of relational contracts be-
tween firms. The achievement of these relational contracts in turn induces an efficient level
of relation-specific investments. This can be observed because repeated market transactions
become sufficiently beneficial for the buyer such that hold up is less likely to occur. This pa-
per thus provides a theoretical underpinning of why some firms are inclined to favor repeated
market transactions over vertical integration for procuring highly specific inputs.
Indeed, due to the aforementioned reasons, a firm might be better off by procuring highly
specific instead of more standardized intermediate products.19 Throughout this paper, the
desired specificity of an intermediate product was treated as exogenous. This is a reasonable
assumption whenever the technology for processing the input does not allow for variations in
its characteristics. Alternatively, firms can invest in production technologies that give them
some scope to process inputs with differential properties. According to the analysis in this
paper, firms might then prefer to procure the most specific inputs that can be still processed
by their present technologies. In this case, a firm’s choice in terms of the specificity of the
19It is important to note that the subsequent argumentation implicitly assumes that additional costs imposed
by tailoring intermediate products are sufficiently low.
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required inputs is made strategically with the aim of deteriorating supplying firm’s bargaining
position in repeated inter-firm trade.
From a pragmatic standpoint, a strong dependency on highly specific inputs may not
necessarily imply that an internal production is optimal for a firm. Rather, as suggested in
this paper, if inputs can be custom-tailored to the extent to which they cannot be processed
by any other firms, a long-term trading arrangement founded on relational contracts with an
external supplier is the superior alternative for their procurement. In situations of relatively
exclusive inputs, a firm can therefore exploit the low bargaining position of its supplier to
induce a cost advantage which cannot be replicated within the organization.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
It is necessary that β > 0 in order to ensure eWi > 0 for at least one i ∈ {1, 2}. Consequently,
(6) is satisfied as long as (7) holds, and can therefore be omitted. Assume first that (8) is
satisfied for the optimal bonus contract. Since µTµ = ‖µ‖2 = 1, the Lagrangian is
L(α, β) = IL +∆Iβ − α− β2 + λ
[
α+
1
2
β2
]
+ ξα. (31)
The first-order conditions are
−1 + λ+ ξ = 0, (32)
∆I + β (λ− 2) = 0. (33)
To find a solution of this problem, suppose for a moment that λ > 0. Accordingly, α +
β2/2 = 0 due to complementary slackness. Since α ≥ 0, this would imply that α∗ = 0 and
β∗ = 0, and consequently, e∗ = (0, 0)T . Hence, λ > 0 cannot be a solution of this problem.
Consequently, λ = 0, i.e. the worker’s participation constraint is not binding. Furthermore,
we can infer from (32) that ξ = 1. Then, complementary slackness implies that α∗ = 0.
Re-arranging (33) with λ = 0 gives β∗ = ∆I/2. This leads to ΠD|RE = IL + (∆I)2/4.
Substituting ΠD|RE and β∗ = ∆I/2 in (8) gives the cut off interest rate
r ≤ ∆I
2
− 2
∆I
[
Π˜RE − IL
]
≡ rRE. (34)
If r > rRE , β∗ = ∆I/2 would violate (8). Hence, the downstream party chooses the maxi-
mum feasible β for r > rRE such that (8) becomes binding. Nevertheless, it is still optimal
to set α∗ = 0. From (8), β∗(r) solves
β2 − (∆I − r)β − IL + Π˜RE = 0, (35)
⇔ β∗(r) = 1
2
(∆I − r)±
[
1
4
(∆I − r)2 + IL − Π˜RE
] 1
2
. (36)
Since it is optimal to choose the highest feasible β, the upper bound is relevant. Notice that
there exits only a solution if (∆I − r)2/4 + IL − Π˜RE ≥ 0, which is equivalent to
r ≤ ∆I ± 2
[
Π˜RE − IL
] 1
2 ≡ r̂RE. (37)
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The upper bound of r̂RE leads to β∗(r) < 0, which cannot be a solution. Accordingly, the
lower bound of r̂RE is relevant. Substituting β∗(r) for rRE < r ≤ r̂RE in the downstream’s
objective function leads to
ΠD|RE(r) =
r
2
[
∆I − r + 2
[
1
4
(∆I − r)2 + IL − Π˜RE
] 1
2
]
+ Π˜RE. (38)
Finally, β∗(r) = 0 for r > r̂RE . This leads to e∗W = (0, 0)
T , and hence, ΠD|RE(r) = IL. 2
Proof of Proposition 2.
Since Π˜RM = ΠD|SM , it follows Π¯U = IL/2 + [∆Iµ+∆Eω]
2 /(8cU). The downstream
party sets PL such that (18) becomes binding. By substituting e∗U = ∆Pµ/cU , one get
PL =
1
2
IL +
1
8cU
(∆Iµ+∆Eω)2 − 1
2cU
(∆P )2. (39)
Suppose for a moment that (20) is satisfied for the optimal premium ∆P . Substituting PL
and e∗U in the downstream’s objective function yields the simplified problem:
max
∆P
ΠD|RM =
1
2
IL +
1
cU
∆I∆P − 1
8cU
(∆Iµ+∆Eω)2 − 1
2cU
(∆P )2. (40)
The first derivative leads to ∆P ∗ = ∆I . Hence, the downstream party obtains
ΠD|RM =
1
2
IL +
1
2cU
(∆I)2 − 1
8cU
[∆Iµ+∆Eω]2 . (41)
Substituting ΠD|RM , ΠD|SM , and ∆P ∗ = ∆I in (20) gives
r ≤ 1
8cU∆I
[∆Iµ−∆Eω]2 ≡ rRM . (42)
If r > rRM , the optimal premium ∆P ∗ = ∆I violates (20). Thus, the downstream party
chooses the highest feasible∆P for r > rRM , which satisfies (20). Technically, (20) becomes
binding such that ∆P ∗ solves
(∆P )2 − 2(∆I − rcU)∆P + 1
4
(∆Iµ+∆Eω)2 + cU
(
2ΠD|SM − IL
)
= 0, (43)
⇔∆P ∗(r) = ∆I − rcU ±
[
(∆I − rcU)2 − 1
4
(∆Iµ+∆Eω)2 − cU
(
2ΠD|SM − IL
)] 12
.(44)
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Since it is optimal to choose the highest feasible ∆P (r), the upper bound is relevant. More-
over, there exits only a solution for ∆P (r) if
(∆I − rcU)2 − 1
4
(∆Iµ+∆Eω)2 − cU
(
2ΠD|SM − IL
) ≥ 0, (45)
⇔ r ≤ ∆I
cU
± 1
cU
[
1
4
(∆Iµ+∆Eω)2 + cU
(
2ΠD|SM − IL
)] 12 ≡ r̂RM . (46)
The upper bound of r̂RM leads to ∆P < 0, which cannot be a solution. Thus, the lower
bound of r̂RM is relevant. Substituting ∆P ∗(r) for rRM < r ≤ r̂RM in the downstream’s
objective function yields
ΠD|RM(r) = r
[
∆I − rcU +
[
(∆I − rcU)2 − 1
4
(∆Iµ+∆Eω)2 − cU
(
2ΠD|SM − IL
)] 12]
+ΠD|SM .
Finally,∆P ∗ = 0 if r > r̂RM . Thus, it is optimal for the downstream party to engage in spot
market exchange such that ΠD|RM(r) = ΠD|SM for r > r̂RM . 2
Proof of Proposition 3.
Since Π˜RM 6= ΠD|SM , it follows Π¯U = (∆E)2/(2cU). The downstream party sets PL such
that the upstream’s participation constraint becomes binding. By substituting e∗U = ∆Pµ/cU
in (18) and solving for PL, one get
PL =
1
2cU
(∆E)2 − 1
2cU
(∆P )2. (47)
Now suppose that (20) is satisfied for the optimal premium∆P . Hence, we can substitute PL
and e∗U in the downstream’s objective function and achieve the simplified problem
max
∆P
ΠD|RM = IL +
1
cU
∆I∆P − 1
2cU
(∆E)2 − 1
2cU
(∆P )2. (48)
The first-order condition gives to ∆P ∗ = ∆I . Consequently, the downstream party obtains
ΠD|RM = IL +
1
2cU
[
(∆I)2 − (∆E)2] . (49)
Substituting ΠD|RM and ∆P ∗ = ∆I in (20) gives
r ≤ 1
2cU∆I
[
(∆I)2 − (∆E)2 − 2cU
(
Π˜RM − IL
)]
≡ rRM . (50)
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If r > rRM , ∆P ∗ = ∆I violates (20). Hence, the downstream party chooses the highest
feasible ∆P for r > rRM , which still satisfies (20). Thus, (20) becomes binding such that
∆P ∗ solves
(∆P )2 − 2(∆I − rcU)∆P + (∆E)2 + 2cU
(
Π˜RM − IL
)
= 0, (51)
⇔ ∆P ∗(r) = ∆I − rcU ±
[
(∆I − rcU)2 − (∆E)2 − 2cU
(
Π˜RM − IL
)] 1
2
. (52)
Again, it is optimal to choose the highest feasible ∆P (r) implying that the upper bound is
relevant. Furthermore, there exits only a solution for ∆P (r) if
(∆I − rcU)2 − (∆E)2 − 2cU
(
Π˜RM − IL
)
≥ 0, (53)
⇔ r ≤ ∆I
cU
± 1
cU
[
(∆E)2 + 2cU
(
Π˜RM − IL
)] 1
2 ≡ r̂RM . (54)
The upper bound of r̂RM implies ∆P < 0, which cannot be a solution. Hence, the lower
bound of r̂RM is relevant. Substituting ∆P ∗(r) for rRM < r ≤ r̂RM in the downstream’s
objective function gives
ΠD|RM(r) = r
[
∆I − rcU +
[
(∆I − rcU)2 − (∆E)2 − 2cU
(
Π˜RM − IL
)] 1
2
]
+ Π˜RM .
(55)
Finally,∆P ∗ = 0 if r > r̂RM . Then, it is optimal for the downstream party to engage in spot
market exchange such that ΠD|RM(r) = ΠD|SM for r > r̂RM . 2
Comparison of Relational Market and Relational Employment.
Consider first the case Π˜RM = ΠD|SM . Then, ΠD|RM ≥ ΠD|RE is equivalent to
(∆E)2 + 2∆I cosϕ∆E + 4cUIL − (∆I)2 (3− 2cU) ≤ 0. (56)
First, we can treat (56) as an equality. By applying the quadratic formula, one get
∆E = −∆I cosϕ±
√
(∆I)2 cos2 ϕ− 4cUIL + (∆I)2 (3− 2cU). (57)
The upper bound is relevant since ∆E > 0. Thus, ΠD|RM ≥ ΠD|RE requires
(∆E)2 ≤
[[
(∆I)2 cos2 ϕ+ (∆I)2 (3− 2cU)− 4cUIL
] 1
2 −∆I cosϕ
]2
≡ Φ. (58)
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In case Π˜RM 6= ΠD|SM , it can be shown that ΠD|RM ≥ ΠD|RE is equivalent to (∆E)2 ≤
(∆I)2 (2− cU) /2 ≡ Φ. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.
Suppose first that r ≤ ri, i = RM,RE. Then, it is necessary to identify whether the
downstream party prefers different relational contracts for the same value of (∆E)2, but
different values of r. First, consider the intervals 0 < (∆E)2 ≤ Φ and Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Φ,
where ΠD|RM ≥ ΠD|RE . Suppose for a moment that rRM ≥ rRE , which is equivalent to
ΠD|RM − Π˜RM
∆I
≥
2
[
ΠD|RE − Π˜RE
]
∆I
. (59)
If rRM ≥ rRE , we have Π˜RM = ΠD|SM and Π˜RE = ΠD|RM , leading to
3ΠD|RM ≥ 2ΠD|RE +ΠD|SM , (60)
which is always true in the intervals 0 < (∆E)2 ≤ Φ and Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Φ. Thus, rRM ≥
rRE . Since ΠD|RM ≥ ΠD|RE in these intervals, the downstream party chooses relational
market if r ≤ rRM , and a spot contract, otherwise.
Next, consider the intervals Φ < (∆E)2 ≤ Θ and Φ < (∆E)2, where ΠD|RE > ΠD|RM .
Suppose for a moment that rRE ≥ rRM , implying Π˜RE = ΠD|SM and Π˜RM = ΠD|RE .
Hence, rRE ≥ rRM is equivalent to
3ΠD|RE ≥ ΠD|RM + 2ΠD|SM , (61)
which is satisfied for Φ < (∆E)2 ≤ Θ and Φ < (∆E)2 since ΠD|RE ≥ ΠD|RM . Thus,
rRE ≥ rRM in these two intervals. Since ΠD|RE ≥ ΠD|RM in these intervals, the downstream
party chooses relational employment if r ≤ rRE . Finally, by substituting the respective fall-
back spot profits in rRM and rRE , one get
rRM =

1
8cU∆I
[∆Iµ−∆Eω]2 , if Π˜RM = ΠD|SM
1
2cU∆I
[
(∆I)2 − (∆E)2] , if Π˜RM = ΠD|SE , (62)
rRE =
∆I
2
− 2
∆I
[
max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|SE} − IL
]
. (63)
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Next, consider the case ri < r ≤ r̂ i, i = RM,RE. Recall that ΠD|RM(r) ≥ ΠD|RE(r) in the
intervals 0 < (∆E)2 ≤ Ψ(r) and Θ < (∆E)2 ≤ Ψ(r), whereas the cut offs Ψ(r) and Ψ(r)
are valid for all r ∈ (ri, r̂ i], i = RM,RE.
Finally, the downstream’s expected profits under relational employment and relational market
are decreasing in r for ri < r ≤ r̂ i, i = RM,RE. Thus, it is necessary to identify the cut off
interest rate r¯ i where the downstream party is indifferent between the respective relational
contract and the best spot alternative. Consider first relational employment. Hence, r¯RE
implies
ΠD|RE(r¯RE) = Π˜RE ⇔ r¯
RE
2
[
∆I − r¯RE + 2
[
1
4
(
∆I − r¯RE)2 + IL − Π˜RE] 12] = 0,
⇔ 1
4
(
∆I − r¯RE)2 + IL − Π˜RE = 1
4
(
∆I − r¯RE)2 . (64)
Because Π˜RE = ΠD|SM > IL, (64) cannot be satisfied. Thus, r̂RE is the relevant cut off
such that the downstream party obtains ΠD|SM if r > r̂RE . Consider now relational market,
where r¯RM implies ΠD|RM(r¯RM) = Π˜RM . By applying the same approach as for relational
employment, one can show that the downstream party obtains ΠD|SM if r > r̂RM . By
substituting the respective fall-back spot profits in r̂RM and r̂RE , one get
r̂RM =

∆I
cU
− 1
cU
[
1
4
(∆Iµ+∆Eω)2 +
1
2
[
(∆I)2 − (∆E)2]] 12 , if Π˜RM = ΠD|SM
1
cU
[∆I −∆E] , if Π˜RM = ΠD|SE ,
r̂RE = ∆I − 2 [max{ΠD|SM ,ΠD|SE} − IL] 12 .
2
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